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Abstract 
In an assessment of representative democracy in Australian local government, this 
paper considers long-run changes in forms of political representation, methods of 
vote counting, franchise arrangements, numbers of local government bodies and 
elected representatives, as well as the thorny question of constitutional recognition. 
This discussion is set against the background of ongoing tensions between the drive 
for economic efficiency and the maintenance of political legitimacy, along with 
more deep-seated divisions emerging from the legal relationship between local and 
state governments and the resultant problems inherent in local government 
autonomy versus state intervention.  
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1. Introduction
The question of representative democracy in Australian local government has been 
overshadowed by the debate over the major micro-economic and managerial 
reforms carried out during the 1990s (Kiss 2003). These reforms were designed 
primarily to ensure local councils better fulfilled one of the principal roles of local 
government, namely the efficient delivery of services to local communities 
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(Dollery et al. 2006). However, the second principal role of local government is to 
provide a forum for the practical expression of democratic values, in particular the 
representation of community interests both locally and, when appropriate, in wider 
regional contexts. Thus the reforms were also intended, at least ostensibly, to shift 
a previously widespread community perception of local councils as simply 
managers of local services and local infrastructure to one where this second 
principal role, as democratically representative bodies, gained in significance 
(Wensing 1997:37; Galligan 1998:205). While the micro-economic and managerial 
aspects of this structural reform process may have seen improved efficiencies 
(Dollery et al. 2008; Sorensen et al. 2007), there nonetheless remains palpable 
disquiet over what is perceived as the ongoing failure, or even a diminished 
capacity, on the part of local government to represent and respond to the needs 
expressed by local communities (May 2003:5). Kiss (2003:104) has argued that the 
representative legitimacy of local government has been “weakened instead of 
strengthened” by these reforms. In a slightly less critical vein, Aulich (1999:19) 
claimed that the dual roles of local government:  
 
… are often in tension: for instance, in relation to the controversial question of 
municipal amalgamations, the argument for larger local government units is 
usually based on the existence of economies of scale in service delivery. The 
opponents of amalgamations generally claim that there are diseconomies of scale 
in relation to the democratic values of representativeness, with large municipal 
units less responsive to community needs and aspirations than smaller ones. 
 
If, as Aulich indicates, attempts to realise economic efficiencies have in themselves 
hindered representative democracy, and if representative democracy remains the 
bedrock of political liberty, then the autonomy of local government, and thereby 
the freedom of the community represented, appears under siege.  
 
In addition to these contemporary Australian concerns, the ongoing question of 
whether local government should be fully self-governing or subject to the 
sovereignty of the state has haunted the political theory of local government since 
its inception. As Wickwar (1970:1-2) puts it: 
 
These antithetical positions run through the whole evolution of modern local 
government theory. They may be traced back to Western Europe’s middle ages, 
when a tradition evolved of local liberties being in practice self-achieved, but … 
this tradition was soon overshadowed by a legal doctrine of local bodies being 
incorporated by the sovereign. They may also be traced back to the emergence of 
the early modern state, when a new classical political theory hesitated between 
thinking of local bodies as quasi-sovereign constituents of the state or as 
subordinate intermediary bodies between the sovereign and his subjects. 
 
During the late eighteenth century, the French administrator Turgot developed a 
plan dividing France into four geographic levels of municipality: the village, the 
region, the province and the entire nation. Those owning property would elect a 
village council to administer the allocation of tax revenues for local public works 
improvements, which would in turn elect a representative to the next level of 
municipal government. With the historical shift occurring during that time from 
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aristocratic, monarchic to bourgeois, democratic forms of government, Turgot’s 
plan soon became highly influential across Europe as well as in the United States 
and Britain. Under Napoleon’s influence, however, the elected local representative 
was replaced with a centrally appointed administrator. Yet this approach was again 
generally reversed during the 1830s and 1840s. While Bentham in Britain 
emphasized the democratic principle of both central and local governments being 
responsible to the people, J.S. Mill argued that nonetheless local government 
should be open to investigation and advice from central government agencies. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, and contrary to the utilitarian centralism of Mill, a 
group of British Fabian socialists, including Sidney and Beatrice Webb, set out five 
principles for local government. As reported by Wickwar (1970:54-5), the fifth of 
those principles holds that: 
 
[l]ocal government thus constituted and freed from judicial, statutory, and sub-
legislative restraints should enjoy as large a measure of freedom and dignity as 
possible. Even as it was, initiative and enterprise came as often from local as from 
central government. The principal historic units ought to be recognized as being 
true general-purpose authorities, exempt from the ultra vires doctrine applied to 
them by the law courts since the mid-nineteenth century … In particular they 
should be free to furnish their public with any service that they could afford, by 
way of self-financing ‘municipal socialism’ and the provision of all manner of free 
educational, cultural, and health facilities. The new invention of grants-in-aid 
could contribute to municipal liberty insofar as they were given on a ‘block’ 
instead of a ‘specific’ basis. 
 
In light of these historically-entwined perspectives on local government autonomy 
and state intervention, we turn our attention to a discussion of different forms of 
local representation and their close relation to different methods of vote counting. 
We then consider trends in the form of representation and vote counting methods in 
the context of Australian local government, before examining historical shifts in 
the franchise. A further factor shaping the representative character of Australian 
local government concerns a declining trend in the number of Australian local 
government bodies and increasing representative: population ratios. In a final 
section we consider the current lack of federal constitutional recognition of 
Australian local government and its implications for representative democracy. 
 
2. Forms of Representation and Vote counting Methods  
The case for a direct, participatory model of democracy, similar to that practiced by 
the ancient Greeks, was strongly advocated by the Swiss philosopher, J.J. 
Rousseau, during the mid-eighteenth century. However, with much larger expanses 
of territory and population now at stake than the old Athenian city-state or 
Rousseau’s Geneva, the model of representative democracy, first practiced in the 
United States at the end of the eighteenth century, has generally been accepted as 
that most suitable for preserving the democratic principle of political equality. The 
English-born Thomas Paine (1969:202), in support of the American model of 
representative democracy, observed that “[b]y ingrafting representation upon 
democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and 
confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population.”  
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Further prominent advocates of representative democracy at this time included the 
American James Maddison and the Englishman Edmund Burke. Both argued for 
what has become known as the trusteeship or corporate form of representation; a 
form which also implicates high levels of education in elected representatives. 
Maddison claimed that with large voting constituencies there was a greater chance 
those with talents and education would be elected (Phillips 2003:20). Burke 
maintained that elected representatives should be entrusted to make informed, 
independent judgments in the best interests of their constituents (Sawer 2003:39). 
In other words, freely-elected representatives should have the requisite knowledge 
and character to make such judgments, and, by virtue of election, are authorised to 
formulate policy and establish strategic directions on behalf of the social collective.  
 
In defending this corporate, trusteeship form of representation, where the governing 
body is likened to a company board of directors, Burke and Maddison were also 
attempting to ensure that those elected would not simply be mouthpieces for 
particular interest groups or local parochial concerns. Yet those defending this 
phonographic or ‘interest’ form of representation, also known as populism, 
generally stand opposed to what they consider the educational elitism inherent in 
the idea of corporate trusteeship. They place great value on personal contact with 
the elected representative and the direct accountability of a member of parliament 
to those s/he represents rather than to any political party with which the 
representative may be aligned.  
  
A third form of representation, known as the mirror form, was later advocated by 
J.S. Mill in the second half of the nineteenth century. Mill argued that the electoral 
system should make it possible for minority interests and opinions to be 
represented or mirrored on a proportional basis according to their numbers within 
an electorate. In common with Maddison and Burke, Mill’s intention was to 
encourage a ‘politics of ideas’, where those with high intellectual capacities and 
independent modes of thinking would become elected representatives (Phillips 
2003:21). Parliament, in Mill’s view, should be a vigorous debating forum with 
various competing ideas. This is evident in Mill’s opposition to proportional 
representation on the basis of social occupation, whereby parliament would more 
likely consist of so-called uneducated representatives drawn from the working 
classes. While Mill in no way denied that working class interests may be 
represented, his concomitant defence of property ownership as a key franchise 
criterion considerably reduced the possibility of such representation. Nevertheless, 
with the introduction of universal adult suffrage in Australia during the 1890s, the 
political representatives of the working classes became delegates whose views were 
to mirror party policy, which in turn reflected the interests of workers.  
 
These forms of electoral representation are shaped to some degree by the particular 
method of vote counting used to determine successful candidates. As Burdess and 
O’Toole (2004:68) indicate, the two major means employed for this purpose are the 
majority and proportional methods. The former is a first-past-the-post, simple 
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majority, or if preferences are to be nominated, an absolute majority mode of 
selection. Since the majority method, with or without preferences, is generally 
applied when only a single successful candidate is possible, it often produces an 
‘interest’ form of representation. This has been the case particularly in local 
government elections where the ratio of population to elected representatives, 
especially in rural and regional areas, is relatively low.  
 
In the case of multi-member electorates, however, a proportional method of vote 
counting is more common. This method depends on a certain quota of votes being 
reached: a quota being calculated according to the ratio of possible votes to 
available positions, and where the votes of eliminated candidates are transferred, 
through preferences, to those remaining in the count. This method gives rise to a 
mirror form of representation, since it has the capacity to reflect or register a 
variety of different political viewpoints within electoral divisions that are more 
densely populated or perhaps more geographically extensive. Table 1 provides a 
tabulated summary of the relations between vote counting methods and the forms 
of representation to which they generally give rise.  
 
Burdess and O’Toole (2004) illustrate the manner in which local government in the 
state of Victoria has, through its voting methods, passed from a long history of 
interest representation to a period of corporate representation during the 1990s, and 
more recently to a mirror or proportional form of representation. They argue that:  
 
A corporate view of representation is not dependent on one system [of vote 
counting] or the other but the type of system can skew representation in two 
significant ways. On the one hand, proportional systems may lead to unstable 
coalitions of minor groups who are often unable to agree on substantive issues. On 
the other hand, majority systems may skew the corporate representation towards 
limited interests in the community. (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:69) 
 
Burdess and O’Toole also suggest (2004:75), as does Balmer (1982:12), that all 
three forms of representation may be embodied in the one elected representative 
and that, depending on a particular issue and its circumstances, a greater weighting 
may be attributed to the one or another. 
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Table 1: Vote counting and Representation in Australian Local Government. 
 Majority Majority 
Preferential 
Proportional 
Method of Vote 
Counting 
Simple majority or 
first-past-the-post 
with no preferences 
counted 
Absolute majority 
with preferences 
counted 
Quota of necessary 
votes calculated 
according to ratio of 
possible votes to 
available positions and 
where votes of 
eliminated candidates 
are transferred, through 
preferences, to those 
remaining  
States and 
Territory  
Queensland, 
Western Australia 
Northern Territory. 
New South Wales 
and Victoria when 
only one or two 
positions are to be 
decided. 
Queensland when 
only one position is 
to be decided. 
New South Wales, 
Victoria, 
South Australia, 
Tasmania  
Application Both single and 
multi-member 
electorates  
Both single and 
multi-member 
electorates 
Multi-member 
electorates 
Form of 
Representation 
Often produces a 
‘phonographic’ or 
‘interest’ form of 
representation, also 
known as populism 
Less prone to 
populism since 
preferential votes 
are counted 
Generally gives rise to a 
‘mirror’ form of 
representation where 
the views of different 
social groups are 
proportionally reflected 
 
3. Trends in Vote counting Methods and Forms of Representation 
No definitive answer to the question of which form of representation is most 
democratic appears possible. However, in recent years a general trend towards the 
proportional method of vote counting is evident. The Association for Good 
Government carried out a study of the 1971 New South Wales local government 
elections to determine whether those council areas using a majority-preferential 
(MP) method of vote counting achieved a better or worse representative outcome 
than where proportional representation (PR) had been employed. As cited in a 1981 
ACIR discussion paper (No.5:16), the key finding of the Association was that: 
 
In every aspect of performance, examined in the survey, PR is superior to MP, 
generally by a very significant amount … In general, … the results of the survey 
show that … proportional representation (PR) consistently gives results that are 
far more satisfactory to the voters and far more just to the candidates than those 
with the majority-preferential method (MP). 
 
Majority-preferential voting in multi-member electorates can lead to candidates 
with a small primary vote nonetheless being elected on second and third 
preferences, although, as Hughes and Costar (2006:69) indicate, this is usually rare. 
Burdess and O’Toole (2004:74-5) outline the support given to the proportional 
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method in Victoria by Labor Party ministers for local government in the late 1980s 
and again in 2002. They further indicate that the National Party has in recent years 
also lent support to the proportional or mirror form of representation, since some 
rural voters were said to be disenfranchised due to the overwhelming success of 
candidates from major regional centres in their electorate. Criticism of the 
proportional method is generally couched in terms of increased administrative 
complexities and opening the door to party political groupings in local government. 
Yet as the ACIR paper (1981:17) argued, candidates need to be aligned with 
particular or associated groups in their community, since without such support they 
stand little chance of election.  
 
While each Australian state has made changes to its method of local government 
vote counting over the past century, four now use the proportional method for 
determining elected representatives in multi-member electorates. Two of these, 
Victoria and New South Wales, revert to the majority preferential method when 
only one or two positions are to be decided. South Australia and Tasmania, which 
once used the first-past-the-post and majority-preferential methods respectively, 
now employ the proportional method exclusively. Queensland and Western 
Australia use the simple majority or first-past-the-post method; however 
Queensland turns to majority- preferential voting when only one vacancy is to be 
decided. In the Northern Territory majority preferential voting is the norm 
(DOTARS 2006:12-13). Of the four states that employ the proportional method of 
vote counting and so appear to favour the mirror form of representation, only 
Tasmania has fully abolished the otherwise prevalent division of local government 
areas (electorates) into wards or ridings. In South Australia, according to figures 
from 2002, 85% of local government electorates still maintain such divisions. 
Victoria is recorded as having 81% of local electorates divided this way, and New 
South Wales 45% (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:68). Because any local government 
area may have a variety of combinations of single and multi-member wards or 
ridings, it remains difficult to gauge more precisely the overall extent of 
proportional representation in the three states that also use the majority-preferential 
method. However, data from Victoria in 2002 (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:72), 
indicated that over half the number of local council bodies had single member 
wards.  
 
The move to ‘whole-of-council’ elections in certain states would also appear to 
strengthen the proportional, mirror form of representation. While ACIR (1981:13) 
indicated over twenty years ago that New South Wales, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory then held whole-of-council elections every three years, three of 
the other states were still committed to annual elections at which one-third of 
representatives would retire or stand for re-election each year after their three-year 
term. In South Australia, half the representatives relinquished their post annually 
after a two-year term. The 2004 Local Government National Report (DOTARS 
2004:8) indicates that New South Wales had moved to a four-year cycle, 
Queensland remained unchanged on a three-year cycle, while Victoria and South 
Australia had moved to whole-of-council elections every three years. Western 
HEARFIELD & DOLLERY: 
Representative Democracy in  
Australian Local Government 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 68 
 
Australia and Tasmania now held a half council election every two years, while in 
the Northern Territory elections could vary between one and four years. Two years 
later, in the 2006 Local Government National Report (DOTARS 2006:12-13), four 
of the six states as well as the Northern Territory are reported as holding whole-of-
council elections every four years. Western Australia and Tasmania remained 
unchanged with half-council elections every two years. The shift to whole-of-
council elections every four years in Victoria and South Australia counters to some 
degree the interest form of representation otherwise prevalent in a ward system, 
where generally only one representative could be elected at any one time. For what 
is often at stake in that situation is not so much the exercise of good government by 
council as a whole, but simply the social standing and personal demeanor of 
individual candidates.  
 
5. Historical Shifts in the Local Government Franchise  
The franchise criteria evident at the time of federation, namely being a British 
subject of at least 21 years of age and being an owner of property, have been 
gradually modified during the course of the twentieth century. The age requirement 
for all tiers of government was reduced to 18 years across all states and territories 
during the early 1970s. At roughly the same time Victoria and South Australia both 
extended the local government franchise entitlement to include non-British subjects 
resident in the state. Western Australia followed suit with the proviso that non-
British residents be nonetheless owners of property. The other three states, along 
with the Northern Territory, maintained being a British subject as a factor in 
determining any right to vote. Since 1984, however, being a British subject 
translates (except for those on a British or Commonwealth of Australia electoral 
roll prior to that year) as being on an Australian state or territory electoral roll; in 
other words, as being or having become an Australian citizen. 
 
Property ownership as a criterion of franchise has a history stretching back to the 
pre-emergent condition of local governing bodies as road boards, which levied 
taxes on landholders for the construction and maintenance of local roads. With 
their transition to local governing bodies, taxes were extended to cover the 
provision of further services such as sewerage and waste disposal. Only genuine 
stakeholders in a local community, it was argued, namely those who paid such 
taxes or rates according to the value of their property or properties, should be 
entitled to vote and so have their interests represented in local council forums. This 
property-based franchise criterion also included those occupiers of land who 
directly paid rates, and the nominees of companies or corporations present in the 
electorate.  
 
In most States the maximum number of votes able to be exercised by an elector 
in any one capacity was twelve. However any property-owner who was 
registered as the nominee of a company or as a ratepaying lessee could also cast 
votes in these capacities. Further, where the local authority was subdivided into 
wards and property was held in a number of wards, then voting rights were 
extended to each ward (ACIR 1981:5). 
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The right to multiple votes based on the total value of property owned was first 
removed in New South Wales in 1906 (Power et al. 1981:31). Nevertheless, if 
properties were owned in more than one ward or riding within a local government 
area then the owner was still entitled to one vote in each of those wards. Also, 
additional votes could be cast if a property owner was also named as a corporate 
nominee. This modified form of plural voting was adopted in Western Australia in 
1960, Victoria in 1968, South Australia in 1976, and Tasmania in 1978 (Power et 
al. 1981:31, 664, 724). Today, plural voting persists in Victoria and to a lesser 
extent Tasmania. New Local Government Acts passed during the 1990s by the 
New South Wales, South Australian and Western Australian governments retained 
a property franchise but applied the principle of one vote per voter across the 
entirety of any one local government area (Kiss 2003:113). 
 
Queensland, however, abolished property ownership altogether as a franchise 
criterion and replaced it with that of residency and state electoral enrolment as 
early as 1920 (DOTARS 2006:13). Similarly in the Northern Territory, residency 
and territorial electoral enrolment are the sole criteria of franchise. Residency as a 
criterion of franchise was subsequently introduced in New South Wales in 1941, 
and while the other four States eventually followed, this did not occur in South 
Australia until as late as 1976 (Power et al. 1981:30-31), and in Victoria until 1982 
(Kiss 2003:113). From an economic perspective, a key argument supporting 
residency as a criterion of franchise is that any rent paid to a property owner in 
return for lodgings effectively includes a proportion attributable to rates. A further 
argument is that the general-purpose grants allocated to local government by the 
Commonwealth are derived from personal income tax paid by all working 
residents.  
 
While residency, age and citizenship have now become the dominant criteria of 
franchise in local government elections, property ownership remains a criterion in 
all States bar Queensland. In Western Australia and New South Wales, any non-
resident property owner or occupier must nevertheless also meet the age and 
citizenship criteria. In Tasmania a voter satisfying these conditions may exercise 
the right to a proxy vote on behalf of a non-resident owner or occupier.  
 
Overall, there was thus a marked decrease in the voting power of property owners 
during the second half of the twentieth century, and over the same period there was 
an increase in the number of eligible voters made possible through the introduction 
of the citizenship and residency criteria now applied in every state and the Northern 
Territory 
 
6. Declining Numbers of Local Government Bodies and Councillors1 
                                                
1
 The term ‘alderman’ was previously used for elected representatives of some city and municipal 
councils.  We also note that our focus in this paper concerns representative democracy generally and 
so does not engage in any specific consideration of women or indigenous representatives.  
Nevertheless it is evident over the last two decades that there has been a marked increase in the 
numbers of both.
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During the late nineteenth century, prior to federation, local government bodies 
were established through both the voluntary petition of resident stakeholder groups 
to their respective state governments, and mandatory decree. Soon after federation, 
in the very early twentieth century, five of the six states, with the exception of 
South Australia, had introduced exclusive mandatory requirements. At this time, 
the number of local government bodies had reached a zenith. Since then, due to 
ongoing boundary alterations and amalgamations promoted by state and territory 
governments, numbers of councils have generally declined. In New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia this decline has been in the order of 50% or more, 
while in Tasmania it is close to 40%. Most recently, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory have undergone major reforms that have reduced the number of local 
governments by around 50% and 75% respectively. The changes in the Northern 
Territory, involving the amalgamation of small Indigenous community councils 
into new ‘shires’ covering vast areas of largely unpopulated land, could fairly be 
described as the most radical structural reform in Australian local government 
history. In Western Australia, by contrast, the number of local governing bodies 
has remained relatively steady since the time of federation with only a slight drop 
in numbers.  
 
Table 2:  Number of Local Councils in Australia 1910-2008. 
 1910 1967 1982 1990 1995 2008 
NSW 
VIC 
QLD 
SA 
WA 
TAS 
NT 
324 
206 
164 
175 
147 
51 
0 
224 
210 
131 
142 
144 
49 
1 
175 
211 
134 
127 
138 
49 
6 
176 
210 
134 
 122* 
138 
46 
22 
177 
184 
125 
119 
144 
29 
63 
152 
79 
73 
68 
142 
29 
16 
* Figure for 1991 
Sources: Chapman (1997:4), May (2003:83), state local government department websites 
 
This decline in the number of local government bodies has been accompanied by a 
corresponding reduction in the number of councillors. In Tasmania, South 
Australia and Victoria, the number of elected representatives has dropped by 37%, 
31% and 73% respectively – that is, from 460 to 288, from 1100 to 760, and from 
2196 to 589 (Kiss 2003:109). A further contributing factor in this decline, albeit 
with lesser impact, has been the sharp fall in the maximum limit of councillors for 
each council in all states except Queensland since the late 1970s. For 1981, Power 
et al. (1981:30) record limits for cities in New South Wales and South Australia of 
around 20 elected representatives, 15 in Tasmania, and 11 in Queensland. Without 
no limits for cities in Victoria and Western Australia, Melbourne City Council is 
then reported as having 33 councillors, while the councils of Perth and Fremantle 
comprised 28 and 19 councillors respectively. However, according to the 2006 
Local Government National Report (DOTARS 2006:12), the maximum limit in 
New South Wales and Western Australia had been reduced to 15, and in Victoria 
12, while the other states had no specified limit. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of Brisbane City Council, which currently consists of 27 councillors, all the other 
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capital city councils across the country currently have no more than twelve and in 
some instances only nine representatives. For smaller municipal and shire councils 
it would appear that the maximum limit has not varied significantly, except in 
Victoria where it has dropped from 18 to 12. Furthermore, over the past 35 years, 
the minimum number of councillors for all categories of councils has fallen from 
six to five in most states. 
 
Thus the overall number of local government representatives across the country is 
far lower than in previous decades. More significantly, and in view of national 
population growth, this indicates that each elected member now represents a much 
larger number of voters than ever before. That varies considerably from state to 
state with those more heavily populated having a far greater ratio of population per 
elected representative. Figures again taken from the 2006 Local Government 
National Report (DOTARS 2006:14) show that in Victoria, which has experienced 
the greatest fall in the number of local government representatives, this ratio 
recently stood at 1:8053. In New South Wales, where the population is almost 40 
per cent higher, but where there has been a less dramatic drop in the number of 
councillors, the ratio was 1:4432. For Queensland (before the recent halving of the 
number of councils), South Australia and Tasmania, these ratios came in at 1:3079, 
1:2046, and 1:1710 respectively. In Western Australia, with only a very slight 
decline in the numbers of councils and representatives, the ratio stood at 1:1475.  It 
is also evident, in view of the still relatively large number of small municipal and 
shire councils in non-metropolitan areas, and the recent decline in the number of 
councillors in many larger urban councils, that the more densely populated 
metropolitan areas have a significantly larger number of people being represented 
by each elected representative than in rural and regional Australia. 
 
The question which emerges here is: does this declining trend in the numbers of 
local government bodies and councillors actually decreases the representative and 
thereby democratic character of local government? An immediate affirmative 
response, however, would seem far too simplistic. For with the franchise having 
now been extended to all resident adult citizens, and with the trend towards 
proportional, mirror representation, where different and various viewpoints have a 
better chance of being represented in local government, it may well be argued that 
the representative, democratic character of local government is in fact increasing. 
This is an issue requiring further investigation. 
 
7. Constitutional Recognition and Local Government Autonomy 
With ever-expanding strategic responsibilities over recent decades in the areas of 
economic, social and environmental planning, the significance of local councils in 
shaping the future well-being of their respective communities has been 
dramatically heightened. Not only has the managerial role of councils with regard 
to the efficient provision of services become more professionalised, but also 
councils have been actively encouraged to engage more fully with their 
community, to be more responsive to community needs, and so better fulfil their 
second major role of providing effective democratic representation. Certainly, since 
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the extension of the franchise to all residents, local government has come to see 
itself as increasingly responsible for the whole community and not just property 
owners. This widening social responsibility is also substantiated on economic 
grounds; namely local government’s expanded revenue base due to the provision of 
Commonwealth general-purpose grants derived in part from personal income tax 
(ACIR 1981:6). The significance of local councils as governing democratic bodies 
has also been recognized, at least to some extent, through the current emphasis on 
inter-government partnership arrangements with both state and Commonwealth 
governments. The major political manifestation of this partnership arrangement is 
the participation of the peak local government body, the Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA), in the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG).  
 
The steps leading to this still informal recognition of local government as a third 
tier of government have been long and arduous. Perhaps the first sign of 
recognition came with the Whitlam government’s 1974 referendum on whether the 
Commonwealth should have the right to provide direct grants to local councils. 
Despite overwhelming rejection, the referendum nonetheless brought increased 
attention to the role of local government. This is nowhere more evident than in the 
Fraser government’s establishment in 1976 of the Advisory Council for Inter-
government Relations (ACIR). An indirect effect of the information and discussion 
papers thereafter published by ACIR was the formal recognition of local 
government in four state constitutions: Victoria and Western Australia in 1979, 
South Australia in 1980, and New South Wales in 1986 (Chapman 1997:6). 
However, while enhancing the status of local government in the four states, none of 
those constitutional amendments, achieved simply through an Act of parliament, 
guarantees local government any basic powers (ACIR 1985:9).  
 
With this in mind, and despite potential challenges in the High Court over the 
interpretation of any reference to local government that might be inserted in the 
Commonwealth constitution, ACIR went on to recommend that recognition of local 
government be entrenched therein on the grounds that this would “explicitly draw 
attention to the complementary nature of the three spheres of government and 
implicitly point to their status as partners in the Australian governmental system” 
(1985:15). Just such a proposition was put to the Australian people in the 
referendum of 1988, only to be soundly rebuffed. Indeed the 1987 Constitutional 
Commission had already made the point that such a proposal would institute a third 
sphere of government leading to counter-productive competition with the states 
(Chapman 1997:6). In view of previous displays of opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of all levels of government, Chapman similarly throws doubt on their capacity 
to engage in any genuine collaborative effort to achieve effective local policy 
outcomes. For this reason, he argues that “the rational allocation of responsibilities, 
optimistically espoused by the ACIR publications, is not really viable” (Chapman 
1997:12). Nonetheless the failure to recognize the autonomy of local government in 
the Commonwealth constitution severely undermines its democratic legitimacy. 
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Whilst the legislative reforms of the 1990s conferred some degree of ‘general 
competence’ power on local councils, that is, allowed councils a modicum of 
autonomy with respect to planning for and managing their local populace, their 
activities are still strictly controlled within the limits of state government 
legislation. Under these conditions, those elected to local government are often 
viewed as nothing more than the political and economic executors of policies 
emerging from their respective state governments. Moreover, local councils remain 
subject to the possibility of summary dismissal through ministerial fiat or a 
legislative act of state parliament, which further reinforces the public perception of 
local government as nothing more than a subsidiary, administrative arm of state 
government. This perception is largely borne out by the relatively small numbers 
voting at local government elections and is a significant factor undermining the 
democratic legitimacy of local government. While voting is compulsory in New 
South Wales, Queensland and more recently Victoria, available data (ACIR 
1981:9) suggest that this still only results in somewhere between 65 and 85% of all 
eligible voters turning out to vote. In those other states where voting remains 
voluntary, the corresponding numbers range from as low as 5 to 40% (ACIR 
1981:9). With higher numbers of voters in those states where voting is compulsory, 
there is less risk of minority interest groups gaining control of a council and some 
confidence that the results reflect the views of the electorate. Formal recognition of 
local government autonomy in the Commonwealth constitution could go a long 
way to changing the current public perception of local government and might thus 
encourage greater electoral participation.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The trend away from a property-based franchise and plural voting to one based on 
residency and one person-one vote has enhanced the representative legitimacy of 
local government. In addition, shifts towards a proportional method of vote 
counting in whole-of-council elections have brought about greater representation of 
different community views. Further, the division of local government areas into 
wards or ridings may ensure that different geographical areas are well represented, 
although this system may tend to favour the phonographic or direct interest form of 
representation with its inherent parochialism, especially when only one candidate is 
to be elected and the majority method of vote counting is employed. On the other 
hand, there has been a marked decline in the number of councils and councillors in 
many states due to local government reforms initiated by state governments and 
ongoing boundary adjustments. This has resulted in increased representative : 
population ratios, particularly in densely populated metropolitan areas, and may 
have decreased the representative, democratic capacity of local governing bodies, 
although the proportional, mirror form of representation may obviate this problem 
to some degree.  
 
Alongside these ongoing difficulties in determining the best form of representative 
democracy for Australian local government, a serious flaw in current arrangements 
is the lack of Commonwealth constitutional recognition of local government as a 
third and autonomous sphere of government. As May (2003:85) puts it in reference 
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to an observation made by Stephen Soul (2000): “[w]ithout constitutional backing, 
Australian local government institutions cannot be truly regarded as legitimate 
democratic entities.” 
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